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This paper reports levels of income inequality and poverty in four Central and Eastern
European countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Russia. Unlike many
previous researchers who examine transition economies, we aggregate the detailed
individual-level income surveys made available through the efforts of the Luxembourg
Income Study at the regional level of analysis. Although national-level investigations
have contributed much to our understanding of the income distribution dynamics, these
studies mask intracountry variance in levels of income inequality and thus may not
capture the true distribution of household income and accurately reflect individual
wellbeing. Accordingly, we compute summary measures of inequality and relative
poverty rates, using both local and national relative poverty lines, for the most recent
waves of data available. We offer comparisons between regional and national median …/…
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incomes and assess levels of inter- and intraregional  income inequality. In addition, we
make comparisons to regions within Western European countries and find that, contrary
to what is often asserted, interregional disparities in Central and Eastern Europe
countries are not as large as those found in some Western European countries.
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Introduction
Regional economic change is an important part of the economic development process in
all countries—rich, poor and middle income. The effects of regional economic change
on poverty, inequality, social exclusion, population health, and other relevant social
dimensions are just beginning to emerge. For instance, recent papers have shown that
China’s regional growth progress has varied considerable by region, leading to rising
inequality within and between China’s regions (Wei and Wu 2002). India shows a
similar pattern. Studies of subnational (regional) poverty and inequality have also
recently been completed for Europe and for other wealthy nations (Goerlich and Mas
2001; Jesuit et al. 2002; Osberg 2000; Rainwater et al. 2001; Stewart 2002).
One of the most rapidly changing regions of the world in the 1990s were the former
centrally planned economies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), including the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Russia, which we study in this paper. These CEE
nations have undergone a very rapid change from planned economies to market-based
societies. As a result, repressed inequalities in wages owing to the Soviet-style
institutions of wage determination largely disappeared during the 1990s. These wage
and earnings patterns were replaced by entrepreneurial and market-based returns to
skills and risk-taking, producing overall national income and earnings inequality levels
in the CEE by the end of the 1990s which resemble those in some Western European
and in other middle-income countries like Mexico (Förster and Tóth 1997; Smeeding
2002). Of course, these changes did not proceed on an even keel within each of these
nations. Some areas prospered and others lagged behind.
While comparative evidence on macroeconomic and labour market related regional
disparities in Central and Eastern Europe is widespread and growing, most of these
analyses are based on macro-regional aggregate data. So far, and despite the significant
contributions made by a recent World Bank report (2001), precious little is known on
the micro level of inequalities, i.e. regional differences in household incomes and
poverty (but see also Bailey 1997).
The present paper seeks to fill some of these gaps and proposes an enhanced analysis of
income inequality, poverty, and to a lesser extent economic growth, across the regions
within four CEE countries. More specifically, is income inequality higher in some areas
than in others within CEE countries? What are the contributions of inter- versus
intraregional inequalities in total income inequality within CEE countries? How does
the adoption of a local rather than a national poverty line affect estimates of poverty
within CEE regions? How do regions within CEE countries compare to regions within
Western Europe? Finally, is there a relationship between economic growth, income
inequality and poverty across CEE regions, as some suggest?2
1 Setting the scence: regional variations in macroeconomic performances and
recent evidence at the micro level
Pretransition governments pursued a centrally planned economic policy which, inter
alia, lead to specific industries (in particular heavy industries) being placed in specific
regions according to political rather than economic criteria. It may therefore be
expected, and has often been claimed, that at the start of transition regional disparities in
terms of macroeconomic performance and employment structure were high in Central
and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the transition to a market economy is believed to
have accentuated those regional disequilibria.1
This seems, indeed, to have happened. Comparative cross-country studies generally
point to an increase in regional disparities with regard to GDP and
employment/unemployment in Central Eastern Europe. The OECD Territorial Outlook
2001 (OECD 2001), for instance, reports that the coefficient of variation of per capita
GDP across regions has risen between 1995 and 1997 in all three central eastern
member countries of the OECD: the Czech Republic (from 31 to 33), Hungary (from 31
to 36) and Poland (from 19 to 24). More precisely, for the Czech Republic the report
defines the northwestern and southeastern regions as most deprived, while Prague and
Plšen seem less affected (OECD 2001:51). For Hungary, a ‘significant widening of
territorial disparities is reported’ due to the fact that the capital region was the only one
capable of withstanding a situation of declining real GDP and increasing unemployment
(OECD 2001:69). For Poland, a clear division between the richer western and poorer
eastern part is described, disturbed by the richest region, the capital region around
Warsaw.
As for regional labour market performances, an early study conducted in the first phase
of transition (OECD 1995) suggests that ‘…spatial variations in unemployment rates
materialized “at a stroke” after the introduction of market-oriented reforms in all
transition countries... (these variations) may last for a long time, because of the different
capacities of regions to adapt to a market-based system’ (OECD 1995:11). Further,
OECD (2001:34) shows that the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are part of those
two-thirds of OECD countries in which regional disparities in unemployment have been
widening in the second half of the 1990s; in the first two countries under a situation of
increasing average (national) unemployment, and in Poland under a situation of
decreasing average unemployment. The latter trend suggests a polarized pattern since
positive employment growth is spatially differentiated.
                                                
1 While we focus on the decompression of earnings as the key cause of rising income inequality during
the transition, such factors such as privatization, land reform, the emergence of an entrepreneurial class,
changes in public policies, and corruption, among others, have all been linked to its growth (see e.g.
Aghion and Blanchard 1994; Atkinson and Micklewright 1992; Commander and Coricelli 1995;
Flemming and Micklewright 1999; World Bank 2001).3
How do the absolute levels of regional disparities compare with ‘traditional’ OECD
countries? Hungary stands out. As far as the regional concentration of total GDP is
concerned, as much as 42 per cent of national GDP is concentrated in its richest region,2
the capital region around Budapest. On OECD average, 25 per cent of GDP is
concentrated in the respective richest regions of countries, and this percentage is slightly
lower in the Czech Republic and Poland (22 per cent and 20 per cent, respectively). The
coefficient of variation of per capita GDP is above OECD average in Hungary,3 around
average in the Czech Republic and below average in Poland (OECD 2001:33).
As for regional variations in unemployment rates, levels in the Czech Republic and
Hungary (no information for Poland is available) actually do not diverge much from
those experienced in other OECD countries (coefficient of variation of 31 for Hungary,
41 for the Czech Republic) and they are in lower than in the two countries with highest
regional variation in unemployment: Germany4 (44) and Italy (61) (OECD 2000:39). In
addition, a decomposition analysis of the variance in unemployment rates shows that
most of the explained variation in unemployment across regions is accounted for by
education in the Czech Republic and Hungary (OECD 2000:42). In sum, regional
disparities in Central Eastern Europe are high but, with the exception of GDP
concentration in Hungary, they do not seem to be extraordinarily high when compared
to OECD countries.
In the most recent in-depth analysis of regional macroeconomic and unemployment
variations, Römisch (2001) shows for nine Central Eastern European countries that, at
the beginning of this decade, there exist large disparities between the capital city regions
and the rest of CEE regions as well as an East-West pattern in terms of GDP and GDP
per capita. Similar patterns are also found in terms of unemployment variations, with a
few exceptions. In Hungary and Poland, for instance, unemployment rates in the eastern
regions are not significantly higher despite GDP levels well below the national average.
Römisch relates this to the high share of agriculture in those regions which do not
generate high GDP but (unlike in Western Europe) are able to absorb or hide open
unemployment.
As for the trend between 1993 and 1998, in accordance with the OECD figures quoted
above, Römisch (2001:5-7) reports regional variations of both total GDP and GDP per
capita5 on the rise throughout CEE countries. To situate the three countries included in
                                                
2 This is the highest value across OECD.
3 In fact, the fourth highest value as Mexico, the United Kingdom and France show still higher
coefficients.
4 This only holds for reunified Germany but not Western Germany taken apart.
5 The (unweighted) nine-country average of the Gini coefficient for the regional GDP distribution
increased from 0.275 to 0.300, and the coefficient of variation of per capita GDP increased from 0.237 to
0.284 between 1993 and 1998.4
the present paper in the frame of other Central Eastern European countries, it should be
noted that their levels of variation of per capita GDP are around average, with lower
variation occurring in Lithuania and, in particular, Bulgaria and higher variation in
Estonia and the Slovak Republic.
A kernel density analysis of the data suggests that ‘without the capital cities, the
distribution (of per capita GDP) has been stable and neither convergence nor divergence
has occurred across the majority of the (poorer) regions in the countries’ (Römisch
2001:9). It also reveals that regions with above-average unemployment at the start are
likely to have even higher unemployment in the following. In explaining the existence
of regional disparities, Römisch’s results point to the importance of the services sector
on relative GDP and unemployment levels.6 Other factors explaining a region’s
economic performance are their distances to the West and their distance to capital city
regions, which both seem to generate positive spillovers. Finally, agglomeration effects
were found to exert a significant and positive influence on regional GDP and
unemployment levels (Römisch 2001:15-18).
While comparative evidence on macroeconomic and labour market related regional
disparities in Central and Eastern Europe is widespread and growing, relatively little is
known on the micro level of inequalities, i.e. regional differences in household incomes
and poverty in a comparative perspective. In his major study on income, inequality and
poverty in transition countries, Milanovic (1998), for instance, attributes one paragraph
to the regional aspect of poverty. Comparing micro data for the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia for the early to mid 1990s, he concludes that ‘poverty
rates decline with increase in the size of locality’ (Milanovic 1998:106). This finding
relates to the larger share of highly skilled people in capital cities and the low level of
income of farmers. The analysis, however, is based on large versus smaller cities and
villages rather than on geographical regions.
A recent report published by the World Bank (2001) addresses many of the
shortcomings of previous research on the market transition in CEE that we have thus far
identified. Indeed, the report offers an exhaustive set of indicators on income inequality
and poverty based on microdata from most of the countries in Central and Eastern
Europe. Furthermore, these microdata are also aggregated at the subnational levels of
analysis so that intracountry disparities may be analyzed. One of the key findings of this
report is that the transition has resulted in divergent economic outcomes in the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, such as Russia, and in the
Central and South Eastern European and Baltic (CSB) countries such as Poland
(2001:163-4). Another important conclusion from this report is that the capital cities in
CEE countries, especially in the CSB countries, have lower rates of poverty than in their
nations as a whole and that there are some regions within countries where the risk of
                                                
6  Regression results were significant also in the specification without the capital city regions.5
poverty is more than 3 times greater than the national rate (2001:74-80). Despite the
significant contribution that this report makes, there are a few remaining gaps that this
paper seeks to fill.
Unlike the World Bank report, we adopt a harmonized definition of household income
and offer a more detailed aggregation of households at the regional level of analysis.
We also we make use of more recent data and examine at least two cross-sections for
each country in order to investigate changes over time. Furthermore, we estimate
income inequality within regions and use both a local and national standard when
measuring poverty, neither of which has been previously accomplished. In addition, we
compare regions within CEE countries to those in West European nations in order to
assess the magnitude of interregional disparities between current EU members, three
candidate countries and Russia. Finally, we offer some very preliminary evidence
concerning the relationship between poverty, income inequality and economic growth in
CEE regions.
2 Data and methods
This paper examines income inequality and income poverty using the harmonized
microdata made available through the efforts of the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS)
for the following countries and years: the Czech Republic (1992, 1996), Hungary (1991,
1994), Poland (1992, 1995, 1999) and Russia (1992, 1995).7 The core concept used in
this paper is that of disposable income. More precisely, gross wages and salaries, self-
employment income, cash property income, pension income and social transfers of all
household members are added and income taxes and mandatory employee contributions
are subtracted to yield household disposable income.8 In order to account for
differences in household size, this paper adopts the standard approach of taking the
square root of the number of household members to calculate equivalent disposable
income (Atkinson et al. 1995:21).9
                                                
7 Detailed information on the characteristics of the underlying surveys can be obtained from the LIS
technical documentation site www.lisproject.org/techdoc.htm. In general, sample sizes of surveys vary
between app. 3,000 (Hungary) and 27,000 (Czech Republic). It bears mentioning that the quality of the
surveys included in the LIS varies somewhat. For example, the LIS datasets for the Czech Republic and
Poland are based upon official sources and are of higher quality than the ‘unofficial’ sources of data for
Russia and Hungary (see Smeeding 2001).
8 Unfortunately, income from home food production is not available in the Wave III datasets and, thus, it
is not included in our income concept.
9 There is an important debate focusing on the various equivalence scales one should adopt when
examining CEE countries (see for example, Lanjouw et al. 1998). However, research has shown that the
choice of equivalency scale is most important when examining a subgroup of the population, such as
children or the elderly. Since we are examining the entire population, our results are not as sensitive to
this choice.6
Another important measurement decision made in this paper concerns top and bottom
coding. We bottom code the LIS datasets at 1 per cent of equivalized mean income and
top code at 10 times the median of non-equivalized income for the nation sample
(Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997:661). This procedure limits the effect of extreme values
at either end of the distribution. Finally, we exclude all records with zero disposable
incomes in the measures of income poverty that we report. This decision is consistent
with Atkinson et al. (1995) and with the method used and recommended by the LIS Key
Figures reported on the LIS website.10 A final methodological decision is whether to
consider inequality and poverty among households or persons (say, to count a couple
with two children four times rather than once). As our concern is with the position of
citizens and to treat each citizen as equal in the distribution, our results refer to ‘person
weights’ which equal the household weight times the number of household members.
11
Finally, many argue that household consumption (expenditure) is preferable to income
when estimating economic wellbeing (see for example, Ravallion 1994). Indeed, we
concede that irregular pay and income underreporting make reliance on income as the
estimate of wellbeing somewhat problematic, especially in Russia (World Bank
2001:367-68). For these reasons, the recent World Bank report on CEE countries (2001)
favours household consumption when measuring poverty,12 but reports both income
and consumption inequality. In fact, previous research has demonstrated that within the
affluent countries findings are very similar whichever approach is adopted. This is also
true within the CEE countries when calculating income inequality, with the exception of
CIS countries such as Russia (see also World Bank 2001:143-4). However, when
comparing our poverty results to those published by the World Bank (2001, Appendix
D), our rates are consistently higher although our ranking of countries remains the same.
Furthermore, contributing to these discrepancies is the fact that we use different years
(and a different survey in the case of Hungary) as well as different equivalency scales.
Nonetheless, in future research we hope to obtain harmonized estimates of household
expenditures for sake of comparison.
2.1 Defining regions
Unfortunately, not all of the national-level surveys from Central or Eastern European
Countries included in the LIS report the respondent’s region/state/province of residence.
In the countries we include in this regional analysis, the units tend to be well defined
politically, territorially and culturally. The exception to this is found in the case of
Hungary, where we were only able to identify Budapest as a geographical unit while the
other categories are based on an urban versus rural definition. In addition, in some cases
                                                
10 www.lisproject.org.
11 This is in line with the current practice in European and international research. Atkinson et al.
(2002:29), for instance, argue ‘We are not suggesting that individuals should be considered in isolation;
but each person should count for one’.
12 Except for Hungary and the Slovak Republic (2001:376).7
we decided to aggregate regions even when a more detailed breakdown was available so
that we could maintain comparability across the LIS data waves13 (for example, in
Poland and in Russia). Finally, due to the reform of Poland’s provinces in 1999, the
regional aggregations for Poland 1999 are not exactly comparable to the groupings in
1992 and 1995.14 However, we believe that this has had little effect on our results since,
in order to maintain comparability between Poland’s Wave III and IV regions, we
aggregate households into nine regions rather than provinces. Specifically, we aggregate
households at the level of Czech regions (8); Hungary’s capital city (Budapest), major
cities, towns, villages and farmsteads; and Polish (9) and Russian regions (9).15 The list
of regions, including the number of observations from which the measures of inequality
and poverty are derived and 95 per cent confidence intervals for the estimates we report,
is included in the Appendix.
2.2 Measures of income inequality and decomposition
We use three general measures to estimate income inequality in our study: the Theil
Index, the Gini coefficient and the ratio of regional and national median incomes. The
Theil Index is an additively decomposable index of income inequality, allowing one to
estimate each subgroup’s contribution to total income inequality within a population
(Cowell 2000:109). In this case, we compute the Theil index using regions as our
subgroup. We also report Gini coefficients at the regional and national levels of
analysis. Gini scores are based on the Lorenz curve, which plots cumulative percentages
of the population against their cumulative aggregate incomes. A value of zero indicates
‘perfect equality’, in which every individual has the same income. A value of one
indicates ‘perfect inequality’ and results if one person has all the income. The advantage
of this measure is that its computation includes the entire income distribution.
Furthermore, it is the best-known measure of inequality in the social sciences. Also
significant for our study, the Gini coefficient is an appropriate estimator of
intraregional income inequality. Finally, as a complementary way of capturing
interregional inequality within a country, we report the regional/national median
income ratio. This is simply computed as the ratio of a region’s median household
equivalent income to the national median household equivalent income. However, all of
these measures are most sensitive to changes around the median and, thus, may not be
as useful in quantifying changes at the bottom (or at the top) of the income distribution,
                                                
13 In the following, the term ‘LIS data wave III’ refers to the early 1990s, ‘wave IV’ to the mid 1990s
and ‘wave V’ to the late 1990s.
14 This administrative reform took effect on 1 January 1999 having become legislation in 1998, with
Poland’s 49 provinces reorganized into 16 new provinces. In any case, we use 9 geographic groups rather
than the provinces thus limiting the effect this has on our results.
15 Ideally we would be able to aggregate households into smaller and/or more relevant subnational units
such as primary sampling units or those having administratively significant boundaries. However, we are
limited to these definitions for practical reasons of data availability, confidentiality and comparability.
Nonetheless, our regional aggregations offer an improvement over previous research.8
a major concern of this study (see Atkinson et al. 1995:23). Accordingly, we also
compute relative poverty rates using both national and local poverty lines.
2.3 Local and national standards in the measure of poverty
The most basic decision poverty researchers confront is whether to adopt an absolute or
relative approach to measuring poverty. The former entails estimating a ‘market basket’
of goods and determining an absolute poverty line that is the cost of purchasing these
goods for households of various sizes. The latter bases the poverty line on the
distribution of income and establishes a point, such as 50 per cent of the median, below
which households are considered ‘poor.’ Most cross-national research on poverty within
affluent countries uses the second method and this is the official approach to measuring
poverty adopted by Eurostat (1998, 2000). In addition to this, however, researchers
conducting regional investigations are confronted with another choice—the definition of
the reference society—whichever approach (absolute or relative) they adopt since
‘…there is also the possibility of variations in standards for defining poverty across the
regions of a nation’ (Rainwater et al. 1999:4). For example, if one is using the absolute
approach to defining poverty, the market basket is adjusted to reflect local prices rather
than a national average. Thus, the poverty line varies regionally according to the costs
of the goods in the basket (see also Citro and Michael 1995).16
In most comparative research on poverty, the poverty line is defined as a fraction of the
national median equivalent income (commonly 50 percent, though 40 percent and 60
percent are also often used). Applying this 50 percent approach to regional analyses, we
are confronted with the choice between using this national standard or substituting a
regional one as a reference group. Rainwater et al. argue that the regional standard
‘…approximates much better, although not perfectly, the community standards for
social activities and participation that define persons as of “average” social standing or
“below average” or “poor”’:
Using a local relative standard takes into account whatever variations in
the cost of living are relevant and relevant differences in consumption,
and relevant differences in social understanding of what consumption
possibilities mean for social participation and related social activities.
(Rainwater et al. 1999:5, see also Rainwater 1991, 1992)
On the other hand, adopting a national-relative standard is sensitive to the wealth of a
region relative to the national standard. This interregional approach more clearly
captures disparities in wealth between regions and does not reflect intraregional income
                                                
16 Note that, under certain policy-related considerations such as the allocation of structural funds in an
enlarged European Union, there are also arguments to look at supranational poverty thresholds, taking the
whole Europe as a reference society. Förster et al. (2002), for instance, estimate indicators for income and
consistent poverty for selected EU candidate countries under European-wide thresholds. See also Beblo
and Knaus (2000).9
inequality per se. This will be more clearly demonstrated in Section 3. Rather than
deciding which approach more accurately measures economic wellbeing, we use both in
this paper.17
The alternative is to use an absolute approach at either the subnational or national level.
The World Bank, for instance uses different absolute poverty lines for each of the
world’s regions: $1 per person per day in Africa; $2 per person per day in Latin
America; $3 per person per day in Central Asia; and $4.3 for Central and Eastern
Europe. The Unites States, on the other hand, has its own ‘absolute’ poverty line of $10-
15 per person per day, depending on family size (Smeeding et al. 2001). However,
absolute poverty standards can be captured nationally only when we can define
comparable baskets of goods in ‘real’ terms across a set of countries. This process can
be achieved using purchasing power parities (PPPs) such as those developed by the
OECD. However, these PPPs are not well suited for microdata and do not account for
wide differences across nations in the way that public goods such as healthcare,
education, and the like are financed (Smeeding and Rainwater 2002). Also, differential
quality of microdata may affect the results since PPPs are calculated relative to
aggregate national account statistics, not microdata (see Smeeding et al. 2001). And
even if the national absolute approach could be tolerated, one would not be able to
actualize the absolute local approach unless regional (local) price indices were also
calculated. For all of these reasons, we use the relative approach in this article.
3R e s u l t s
In the following tables and figures, we report levels of income inequality and poverty
for the four countries we examine and their 31 regions over three points in time in the
1990s. Confidence intervals based on the bootstrap standard errors of the estimates are
also reported, allowing us to make conclusions with greater statistical certainty.18 We
begin at the national level, where we find that there are considerable differences in
levels of income inequality and poverty between countries and that these levels
increased in all of the countries during the 1990s. Next, we examine intra- and
interregional inequality and report regional figures and conclude that there is substantial
variation with respect to levels of economic wellbeing within each of the countries. In
this section we also explore the effects of using different poverty lines and find that
there are often significant consequences associated with using a regional or national
poverty line threshold. Finally, we look at trends in micro- and macroeconomic
disparities for two regions with different growth patterns in the Czech Republic in the 1990s.
                                                
17 See Jäntti and Danziger (2000:326-33) for an overview of alternative measures of poverty, including
the often used Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) class of indicators. In future research we hope to
exploit some of these measures.
18 We use 300 iterations of the bootstrap in order to calculate our standard errors and confidence intervals
(see Osberg 2000; Osberg and Xu 1999).10
3.1 National rates and trends
Before moving to our regional results, it is useful to examine national levels and trends
in income inequality and relative poverty. Table 1 reports overall Theil Indices, Gini
coefficients and relative poverty rates (at 50 per cent and 60 per cent of the median) for
each of the datasets we examine. As shown in this table, levels of income inequality and
relative poverty varied considerably between the four Central and Eastern European
countries and there is a clear ranking. Namely, the Czech Republic consistently reported
the lowest levels of income inequality and poverty, followed by Hungary and Poland,
which have similar levels, and then by Russia, which reported the largest levels of
income inequality and poverty among the four countries. Although one should be
cautious when interpreting trends from just two points in time, the results indicate that
income inequality and poverty increased in all of the countries between the early and
mid 1990s. However, the figures for Poland 1999, the only result from the late 1990s we
include in our analysis, suggests that this trend reversed towards the end of the
decade.19 Nonetheless, there was still a net increase in income inequality and poverty
within Poland over the course of the decade of the 1990s. In future work, we will
determine if this same trend is evident in the other countries that we examine.
Table 1: National income inequality and poverty
Income Inequality Relative Poverty
Country Theil Gini 50% median 60% median
Czech Rep. 1992 0.082 0.207 2.3 6.5
Czech Rep. 1996 0.120 0.259 4.9 10.5
Hungary 1991 0.145 0.283 8.2 14.3
Hungary 1994 0.185 0.323 10.1 15
Poland 1992 0.123 0.274 7.7 13.7
Poland 1995 0.190 0.318 11.6 17.7
Poland 1999 0.170 0.293 8.6 15.2
Russia 1992 0.273 0.395 19.3 25.9
Russia 1995 0.351 0.447 20.1 25.7
Source: Authors’ calculations from LIS.
3.2 Intra- and interregional income inequality
As a first step in our regional analysis, Figure 1 displays Theil Indices for each of the
countries we examine, plus Italy. We include Italy as a reference since it is a country
widely known to have the large regional disparities.20 As discussed, the Theil is a
decomposable index of income inequality that makes it particularly suited for our
                                                
19 Trend estimates for Hungary point to a similar pattern; increasing inequality in the early and again mid
1990s, followed by a stabilization in the late 1990s (Szivosz and Tóth 2001; Förster and Pellizzari 2000).
20 See Jesuit et al. (2002) for results on regional poverty within West European countries. In some of the
following figures, we also compare our results to 75 regions from 5 West European countries since 3 of
our 4 countries are EU candidate countries.11
regional analysis (see Cowell 2000). In this case, we can determine the proportion of
income inequality attributable to intraregional inequalities versus interregional
inequalities. As shown in the figure (and Table 1), inequality increased in all of
countries between the early 1990s and mid 1990s. Furthermore, the decomposition
shows that both intra- and interregional inequality increased between the early and mid
1990s. However, the results from Poland—the only country for which we have LIS data
available for Wave V, at the moment—suggest that inequality may have receded in the
late 1990s. In terms of ranking the countries, interregional disparities were greatest in
Russia in 1995 (even larger than in Italy) and lowest in Poland in 1992. Finally, by
converting the Theil indices to proportions, it is evident that the vast majority of
inequality in each of the countries is due to intraregional, rather than interregional
disparities, ranging from 90.1 per cent in Russia in 1995 to as much as 98.7 per cent in
Poland in 1992—this is also clearly shown in the figure by the relative sizes of the bars.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, the interregional part of income inequality in EU
candidate countries is thus lower than in some of EU member countries.
Although Figure 1 provides a general portrait of regional inequalities in Central and
Eastern European countries, Figures 2-5 offer a more detailed description of intra- and
interregional inequality, respectively. In Figure 2, we plot the distribution of regional
Gini coefficients using modified ‘box and whiskers’ plots (see Tukey 1977). In these
summary plots, the line across the box represents the median regional Gini coefficient
while the box indicates the interquartile range (difference between the regional Gini at
the 25th and 75th percentiles). The whiskers, or lines extending above and below the
box, report the maximum and minimum reported Gini coefficient within each country.
Each box represents a country and the number of regions within each is reported along
the x-axis. We also include an aggregation of the 31 CEE regions we examine in Waves
III and IV and an aggregation of regional figures from five West European countries
reported in Jesuit et al. 2002.21 This latter figure allows us to make more direct
comparisons to regional disparities within West and Central/East European regions.
By examining both the lengths of the boxes (interquartile range) and the range between
the minimum and maximum values (the whiskers), Figure 2 illustrates that intraregional
inequalities varied widely in the countries under examination. In fact, studies limited to
the national level of analysis miss a great deal of intracountry variance in levels of
income inequality. For example, the Gini coefficient for the whole of the Czech
Republic in 1992 equaled 0.207. In Prague, however, the gap between the rich and the
poor was considerably wider and the Gini equaled 0.263 in the same year (also
represented by the top of the whisker extending from the box in Figure 2; the maximum
value in the Czech Republic in 1992). In Poland and Hungary, there are similar findings
                                                
21 The five countries comprising the 75 West European regions are: Finland (1991, 1995), France (1989,
1994), Italy (1991, 1995), the United Kingdom (1991, 1995) and West Germany (1989, 1994).12
Figure 1: Theil coefficients, within versus between regions
Source: Authors’s calculations using LIS.
























in that income inequality was higher in  the urban capital cities than within the nations as a
whole, though we are unable to conclude that this was the case in Poland for 1992 or for
either year in Hungary with 95 per cent certainty. In Russia, on the other hand, income
inequality in the urban capital Moscow was significantly lower than the national figures—
Moscow (1992) Gini = 0.328; Russia (1992) Gini = 0.395. It follows that the levels of
income inequality in the capitals Budapest, Warsaw and Moscow were more similar than
in their respective countries.
Figure 2: Regional Gini coefficient box plots




























Figure 3: Regional Gini coefficients
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Furthermore, it is evident that the regional levels of income inequality, as well as the
range of regional inequality indicated by the length of the boxes in Figure 2 (the
interquartile ranges), increased in all of the countries between the early and mid 1990s.
This trend was witnessed most dramatically in the Czech Republic and Russia where the
median regional Gini coefficient increased to 0.254 from 0.200 and to 0.430 from 0.365,
respectively. On the other hand, the evidence shows once again that income inequality
declined between 1996 and 1999 in Poland. In many cases the confidence intervals we
report do not overlap and thus indicate that we can be at least 95 per cent sure of these
changes in regional inequality over time. Finally, when compared to the 75 EU regions
in Western Europe, Figure 2 suggests that the range of intraregional income inequality
within Central and Eastern Europe is considerably wider than in Western Europe.
However, much of this is due to the inclusion of Russia, which is not currently a
candidate for entry into the EU. If we were to exclude these regions from the box plot,
we would find that the levels of intraregional inequality with Central and Eastern
Europe are, in fact, similar to levels in the West.
Figure 4: Ratio of regional to national median household income box plots


























Figure 5: Regional median/national median
Source: Authors’ calculations using LIS.





























In contrast to the preceding figures detailing intraregional income inequality, Figures 4
and 5 offer a more precise picture of interregional disparities within each of the
countries. In this case, we plot the ratio of each region’s median household income to
the national median household income. Examining the countries, we find that
interregional disparities were significantly greater in Russia and Hungary22 than in the
Czech Republic and Poland. For example, in Figure 4 we can see that in Poland in 1992
the interquartile range equaled 92.8 per cent at the 25th percentile and 106.4 per cent at
the 75th percentile while these figures equaled 81.5 per cent and 124.7 per cent,
respectively, in Russia in the same year. Finally, in the two countries with wider
regional disparities, Hungary and Russia, the gap between the regions widened in the
1990s. The interregional gap in the Czech Republic and Poland, on the other hand,
essentially remained stable and perhaps narrowed between the waves. Finally, we once
again find that the range of regional inequality is greater in the CEE countries than
within Western EU regions but it is also clear that these distributions are again
influenced by the considerably wider distribution within Russia.
When examining Figure 5 more closely, it is evident that some regions were ‘winners’
relative to the national median income while others were ‘losers.’ For example, Prague,
Budapest and Moscow were all winners in that the gap between these regions and the
nation as a whole widened in the early 1990s. Whereas North Bohemia in the Czech
Republic, farmsteads in Hungary, and East Siberia in Russia are all example of losers.
In fact, one general pattern that emerges from Figure 5 is that the urban–rural gap grew
within Central and Eastern European countries during the first half of the 1990s.
In sum, there is a good deal of regional variation in levels of income inequality within
the countries we examine. In fact, it is evident that national income inequality figures
mask a great deal of within-country variance in the level of inequality. Furthermore,
regional disparities are greater in Russia and Hungary than they are in the Czech
Republic and Poland. We also found strong evidence indicating that both intra- and
interregional inequalities grew in the countries under examination during the first half of
the 1990s. With regard to the latter point, this is especially true in the countries that had
the largest initial levels of income inequality, Hungary and Russia. However, the
evidence from Poland in Wave V suggests that this trend may have been reversed in the
second half of the 1990s.
Finally, when compared to regions within Western Europe, we found that both intra-
and interregional inequality was greater in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s, a
conclusion which has perhaps become part of the ‘conventional wisdom’ when
discussing regional disparities in the CEE versus the West. However, if we were to
exclude Russia from the CEE regional aggregation, we would find that the rates of
                                                
22 Caution has to be applied when interpreting the results for Hungary. As noted earlier, regions in
Hungary do not refer to administrative entities such as in the other countries but rather to socioeconomic
rural–urban categories, a fact which may overstate income disparities.18
inequality are more similar than is often claimed, although regional disparities still tend
to be somewhat greater within CEE countries than in the West.
3.3 Regional poverty
Although the preceding description of regional income inequality provided some
important insights, it told us little about the economic wellbeing of individuals within
Central and Eastern European regions. Accordingly, we chose to focus more attention
on the bottom of the income distribution and estimated relative poverty in the 31
regions. Thus, Figures 6 and 7 report regional poverty rates for the countries we
examine using the national poverty line for Waves III, IV and V (Poland only).
Figure 6: Poverty rates using the national line
Source: Authors’ calculations using LIS.
The box and whiskers plot shown in Figure 6 and the plot of values and confidence
intervals displayed in Figure 7 clearly demonstrate that there is a great deal of regional
variation in the rate of poverty across the regions of Central and Eastern Europe. For







































Figure 7: Regional poverty rates, national lines
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shown in Figure 6, extended from 3.2 per cent to 13.7 per cent poverty, with a median
poverty rate equal to 7.7 per cent. For comparison, the same figures for the Western
European regions are 5.7 per cent and 12.8 per cent for the interquartile range with a
median equal to 7.9 per cent. Furthermore, there is also a good deal of variation in the
rate of poverty within countries. In Russia, the country that showed the largest regional
variation in poverty in both waves, the interquartile range extended from 12.9 per cent
to 25.2 per cent in 1992 and the median regional poverty rate equaled 19.0 per cent in
this same year. Furthermore, in 1992 poverty ranged from a low of 6.4 per cent in
Moscow to a high 29 per cent in West Siberia. This latter point is also shown clearly in
Figure 7 and we can conclude with 95 per cent statistical certainty that poverty was
lower in Moscow than in nearly every other region in Russia (with the exception of East
Siberia where the confidence intervals overlap slightly).23 In the Czech Republic, on the
other hand, we found considerably less variance in the rate of poverty across the
regions. As shown in Figure 6, the interquartile range in the poverty rate in 1992
extended from 1.8 per cent to 2.6 per cent and ranged from a low of 1.6 per cent in
North Bohemia to a high of 3.2 per cent in West Bohemia. Nonetheless, the national
poverty rate for the Czech Republic of 2.3 per cent (shown in Figure 7) would still hide
some regional variation.
Figures 6 and 7 also clearly show that the interregional poverty gap within all countries
widened between Waves III and IV, as evidenced by the lengthening of the boxes and
the whiskers in Figure 6. This is most clearly seen in Hungary and Poland. Interestingly,
the gap between regions narrowed considerably in Poland between Waves IV and V. In
fact, the interquartile range in Poland in Wave V is slightly smaller than the range
reported in Wave III (down to 0.7 per cent from 2.2 per cent). Despite this narrowing,
the regional median poverty rate was higher in Poland in Wave V than in Wave III and
thus poverty did shift upwards during the decade of the 1990s. Finally, it is important to
note that the poverty estimates increased in every region between LIS Waves III and IV.
In fact, this increase was statistically significant in about half of the regions examined.
As discussed previously, measuring poverty at the regional level of analysis involves
the question of: what is the more appropriate reference society, the local community
(region) or the nation as a whole? In Figures 8 and 9, we report regional poverty rates
using a local poverty line to compare to the results using the national line just discussed.
As shown in Figure 8, there continues to be a wide variance in regional poverty even
when a local poverty line is adopted. For example, the interquartile range for the 31
regions we examined in Wave III extended from 4.3 per cent to 15.6 per cent. Within
most countries, however, the reported regional disparities in the rate of poverty are
lower when the local line is adopted. This is most clearly shown in the results for
                                                
23 In fact, we are being rather restrictive in our use of the confidence intervals since we only want to be
95 per cent certain that the poverty rate in one region is higher than in another. When confidence intervals
do not overlap it indicates a ‘stricter condition’ that a region’s poverty rate is higher than a value x and,
independently, that another region’s rate is lower than x (see Stewart 2002:14).21
Russia. Comparing these box plots to the distributions reported in Figure 4 we find that
the interquartile range in regional poverty extends from 15.8 per cent to 20.6 per cent in
Wave III using the local line, while the national line yielded a range from 12.9 per cent
to 25.2 per cent. This is true in the other countries with the exception of the Czech
Republic, where the range in values is actually slightly wider user a local line. Finally,
the most striking difference between Figure 4 and Figure 6, which plotted the box and
whiskers using the national poverty line, is the comparison with the 75 West European
regions. Specifically, when a local line is adopted it appears that regional disparities in
the rate of poverty are wider in CEE than in West Europe. This is not due to higher
variations in poverty in CEE countries when using local poverty lines (they are, in fact,
slightly lower than when using national poverty lines) but to a much lower variation in
western EU countries.
Figure 8: Poverty rates using the local line







































Figure 9: Regional poverty rates, local lines
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More significantly, there are some considerable differences that arise from using
different poverty lines. This can be seen when comparing the results shown in Figure 9
with the results displayed in Figure 7. For example, the poverty rate in West Siberia,
Russia was reported at 29 per cent using the national line and was equal to 20.5 per cent
when the local line was adopted. Similarly, in Wave IV in the Volga Basin in Russia the
poverty rate using the national line equals 30.1 per cent while it equals 20.4 per cent
using the local line. Based upon the confidence intervals, which do not overlap on these
estimates, we can conclude that the rates of poverty using these various lines differ. In
Hungary, the rate of poverty among farmers is more than halved when a ‘local’ line is
adopted, although we cannot say that these estimates differ with any statistical certainty.
In these regions, and many others, using a national line could result in overestimating
the extent of poverty in a region. On the other hand, in other regions the adoption of a
local line results in regional poverty rates that are higher than reported when using a
national line, indicating that the use of the former could result in significantly
understating the level of poverty in a region. In Moscow in Wave IV, for example, the
poverty rate using the national line equals about 3 per cent while the same figure
increases to almost 19 per cent when a local line is used. The same is true in Budapest,
where the use of a local line indicates that poverty in the capital city is equal to about 13
per cent while the poverty rate using a national line equals roughly 6 per cent. These
results raise questions about the finding that poverty tends to be lower in the capital
cities of CEE countries than in the rest of the countries, which was a major conclusion
of the World Bank report (2001:74-6) and which we also found some evidence of using
national lines. In short, national standard poverty lines fail to account for local standards
and costs of living, which vary considerable across the regions within CEE countries.
Once again, the confidence intervals for these differing rates indicate that we can be at
least a 95 per cent certain that the reported poverty rates differ.
Despite these important discrepancies, there is a fairly strong relationship between both
measures of poverty, as we would expect. This is more clearly demonstrated in Figure
10, which plots the two estimates of poverty. As shown in this figure, between one-half
and about two-thirds of the variance between the poverty rate using the local line and
the rate using the national line is shared in Waves III and IV. Furthermore, this figure
also emphasizes the important discrepancies between the two rates of poverty we just
discussed. Namely, the use of a national or local poverty line only has significant
consequences in countries where there is considerable regional diversity, such as in
Russia or Hungary. The explanation for this is straightforward since the regional
poverty thresholds are determined by the median incomes of the nation and the region.
Where there is a larger divergence between these two figures, we can expect a larger
discrepancy between the two poverty rates. This is clearly shown in Figure 11, which
plots the ratio of poverty rates to the ratio of median incomes. Using a national line we
are able to rank regions by their relative wealth and determine which regions are further
away from their country’s national standard. In effect, the national line allows us to
gauge a nation’s interregional inequality in economic wellbeing. For example, the fact25
that more than one-quarter of Russians living in the Volga Basin fell below the Russian
poverty line in both waves reflects the fact that the Volga Basin is poor compared to
Russia as a whole, as demonstrated in Figure 7. Such an approach also more clearly
approximates the EU’s current criteria for the allocation of Objective 1 funds, which
may be an issue due to prospects of pending enlargement in three of the four countries
examined (European Commission 1999).
Figure 10: Scatterplot between poverty rates, national line versus local line, Waves III
and IV
Source: Authors’ calculations using LIS.
The local poverty line, on the other hand, captures intraregional poverty or inequality.
Furthermore, the local line takes into account differing standards of living across
regions and, to a certain extent, varying prices.24 Using the Volga Basin as an example
once again, it is evident that there are still many poor people in this region even after
adopting a local line. However, the point is that they are poor compared to others in
their region, not only compared to Russians as a whole. In addition, there are regions
that are relatively wealthy and where local standards as well as the cost of living are
higher compared to the nation as a whole. We identified Moscow, Prague and Budapest
as such instances. In these cases, we may actually understate the level of poverty within
a region and hence fail to identify persons who are in danger of being marginalized and
quite possibly in economic need. Nonetheless, despite the proposed theoretical
                                                







































advantages associated with a local approach, both methods complement each other in
presenting us with a clearer portrait of regional poverty within countries.
Figure 11: Scatterplot between the ration of median incomes and the ratio of poverty
lines, Waves III and IV
Source: Authors’ calculations using LIS.
3.4 Regional growth and inequality in the Czech Republic and Poland: tentative
evidence
Our final analysis focuses on the relationship between income inequality and economic
growth. Due to data limitations, we are only able to examine 17 regions in two
countries: the Czech Republic and Poland. Furthermore, we cannot examine the same
periods of time for both countries and thus results must be considered very tentative.
Table 2 reports annual per capita GDP growth within these regions and the countries as
a whole, adjusted using purchasing power parities (PPPs). The regions we consider in
this section include the most ‘dynamic’, as well as those that lagged behind. We also
Wave IV R2 = 0.8002


















































report annual percent changes in the income inequality and poverty measures we use in
this paper as well as two additional indicators: the share of total income received at the
top and bottom quintiles of the population. These summary indicators enable us to
tentatively examine whether there is a systematic relationship between economic growth
and poverty/inequality, and whether inequality trends are driven by movements at the
top and bottom of the income distribution (i.e. ‘rich getting richer’ and/or ‘poor getting
poorer’).
Table 2. Regional annual percent changes in growth and inequality
GDPp
c
Poverty Percentile Ratios Income Shares
Region (PPP) Gini National Local P90P50 P10P50 Top 20% Bottom 20%
Czech Republic
1 7.1 5.7 20.8 - 3.6 -2.4 2.5 -4.0
Prague 8.7 2.7 8.5 14.3 1.9 -2.9 0.9 -3.6
Central Bohemia 6.2 4.6 9.6 7.9 3.8 -1.8 2.4 -3.0
South Bohemia 6.1 4.3 21.9 20.2 2.6 -2.7 1.7 -3.6
West Bohemia 6.9 4.2 16.5 13.4 2.5 -2.2 1.7 -3.6
North Bohemia 7.1 9.0 30.6 19.7 4.6 -3.4 4.6 -6.3
East Bohemia 5.8 6.0 11.9 20.0 3.2 -2.4 2.7 -3.6
South Moravia 5.3 6.8 19.9 22.4 3.9 -3.0 2.8 -4.7
North Moravia 8.3 5.5 16.6 14.3 2.9 -2.0 2.5 -3.4
Poland
2 6.5 -2.1 -7.8 - -0.2 2.6 -0.7 4.1
Central, Capital 11.1 -1.0 -9.0 -4.6 1.3 2.3 -0.1 3.8
Middle 4.7 -1.6 -14.2 -11.6 0.1 3.8 -0.1 4.9
Middle East 3.5 -5.7 -20.7 -22.8 -1.0 12.2 -2.2 12.6
Middle West 6.6 -2.2 -10.6 -6.9 -0.6 1.9 -0.7 3.9
North 6.2 -2.1 -1.5 -2.4 -0.9 0.6 -1.0 2.3
Northeast 6.2 -1.2 -4.6 -7.4 0.6 3.4 0.1 5.0
South 4.5 -1.2 4.5 -1.9 -0.5 0.0 -0.5 1.3
Southeast 6.4 -2.7 -11.7 -10.1 -0.5 4.2 -1.0 4.9
Southwest 6.0 -2.7 -2.4 -2.9 -0.9 0.3 -1.6 2.3
Note: All figures computed using annual growth trends (exponential curve algorithm (y=b*m^x)).
1GDPpc
between 1993 and 1996. Inequality measures between 1992 and 1996. 
2All figures between 1995 and
1999.
Source: Computations from LIS micro data; WIIW (2002).
It is important to note that the national trends in income inequality and poverty
diverged. This could be due to the time periods under examination and differences in
the economic cycles. Nonetheless, at first sight, Prague and the Warsaw region stand out
as having the highest rates of annual growth. In fact, annual economic growth in the
Warsaw region was nearly double the rate in the country as a whole. This confirms our
earlier findings that capital cities tended to be the largest beneficiaries of the transition.
The annual increase in both poverty and inequality in Prague was only half that
recorded in the whole country, while the least dynamic region in the Czech Republic28
(south Moravia) witnessed an above-average increase in inequality and the highest rise
in poverty throughout the country. This suggests that higher economic growth is
associated with a slower growth of poverty and inequality in the Czech Republic.
However, the more recent results for Poland point in the inverse direction: inequality
and poverty decreased nationwide between 1995 and 1999, but they increased most in
the least dynamic region (Central East) and least in the Warsaw region. Examples from
other regions, such as North Bohemia in the Czech Republic and the North East in
Poland, qualify these findings further. In both regions the economy grew per capita by
as much as in the whole nation but the performance of indicators of inequality and
poverty was well below the national average. Some of the explanation is given in the
6th to 9th columns of Table 2, which shows trends in the upper and lower part of the
distribution. In the economically less dynamic regions of Central East and Central in
Poland, and South Moravia and East Bohemia in the Czech Republic, the higher
incomes lost relatively more in the Polish regions and gained relatively less in the Czech
regions than in other regions in their countries. The lower incomes tended to lose less in
these same regions in the Czech Republic and gain more in Poland relative to the other
regions. In fact, the less well-off did best in the region with the lowest reported rate of
economic growth, the Central East in Poland. To the contrary, the top income segment
in the dynamic region of Prague gained much less than the top in the rest of their
country, while the poorer segments lost less or as much as elsewhere in the Czech
Republic. These few figures seem to challenge the conventional assumption according
to which inequality in dynamic regions of CEE countries increases mainly because the
‘rich get richer’ and it increases in regions lagging behind mainly because the ‘poor get
poorer’.
Simple bivariate correlations between regional economic growth and the measures of
income inequality and poverty did not show any significant correlation (tables not
reported). However, for a number of reasons including varying starting conditions
across regions and the impossibility to identify trends below the surface of averages and
other measurement issues, finding no correlation between growth, inequality and
poverty across regions is not the same as saying that there is no impact of economic
growth, as Ravallion (2001:11-14) rightly points out. However, for a sound and
thorough evaluation we would need to include more regions and counties in our
analysis.
4 Conclusions
This paper has shed some light on the effects of regional economic change on poverty
and inequality within four Central and Eastern European nations. But this is only a start.
Much remains to be accomplished in our research. For instance regional growth should
be linked to regional change in inequality in a consistent and exhaustive way. And
economic change needs be linked to demographic change (emigration, immigration and
fertility) within declining and growing regions. Finally, it is our long-term goal to link29
regional economic and social change to health outcomes and schooling patterns (see for
example Stewart 2002). Still, our initial results are promising and sensible. The
following preliminary findings emerge from our analyses:
(i)  We find that capital cities and major urban areas are mainly winners, while
regions which are longer distances from central cities and which are further from
their richer western neighbours characterize losers. This has led to rising
differences between rich and poor regions as well as greater inequality within
regions.
(ii)  We show that the contribution of intraregional inequalities to overall inequality
largely outweighs the interregional contribution and, contrary to conventional
wisdom, the latter is less important in CEE countries than in some of the western
EU countries.
(iii)  In the three EU candidate countries included in our analysis, inequality was
higher in capital cities than within the nations as a whole, but the inverse was
true for the Russian Federation.
(iv)  The urban–rural gap seems to have increased in all countries.
(v)  Variations in poverty and inequality across and within regions are considerably
higher in the Russian Federation than in the three EU candidate countries. In
these three countries, variations are somewhat but not considerably higher than
in western EU countries.
(vi)  With the notable exception of the Czech Republic, regional disparities in the rate
of poverty are lower when a local poverty threshold is adopted.
While these results are somewhat tentative at this time, they point to both winners and
losers in the changeover from planned to market economies in the four countries. They
also suggest that the transition may have exacerbated regional differences and that
national and international authorities need to pay greater attention to regional disparities
within and across nations as they design economic and social policies.
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